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WATER POLLUTION CONTROL REFORM IN IOWA:
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
ACT OF 1972
For over fifty years the State of Iowa has actively sought workable
solutions to the problem of water pollution control. The latest
and most extensive effort came in 1972, when the Iowa General
Assembly repealed state water pollution control provisions enacted
in 19651 and then substantially re-enacted the provisions as part
of a completely reorganized scheme of administration and enforce-
ment.2 Although the operative water pollution control provisions of
the 1965 Act and the 1972 Act are practically identical,3 important
changes have been effected in the administration of those provisions by
the 1972 Act's extensive structural reorganization of the control pro-
gram.4 The result is a plan that both retains the Iowa tradition of in-
formal enforcement proceedings and seeks to eliminate previous ad-
ministrative obstacles to the effectiveness of the overall program. By
recognizing the deficiencies in water pollution control administration
that the 1965 Act intended to remedy, valuable insight into the pur-
poses of the 1972 reorganization can be obtained.
Water pollution control in Iowa, as in most states, has experienced
three evolutionary stages,5 passing from purely local, and conse-
quently limited, measures to regulation by a central state agency
not solely concerned with water pollution control, and finally to regula-
tion by a centralized public control agency exclusively concerned with
water pollution problems., At the second stage, Iowa in 1923 en-
I. Ch. 375, [1965] Iowa Acts 61st G.A. 540 (repealed 1972).
2. Ch. 1119, [1972] Iowa Acts 64th G.A. 401, re-enacting IowA CODE § 455B
(Supp. 1973).
3. Letter from Joseph E. Obr, Director, Iowa Department of Environmental
Quality, to the Urban Law Annual, Oct. 29, 1973, on file with the Urban Law
Annual [hereinafter cited as Letter from the Director]. Compare IOwA CODE §§
455B.30-.48 (Supp. 1973), with ch. 375, §§ 9-28, [1965] Iowa Acts 61st G.A. 540
(repealed 1972).
4. See IOWA CODE §§ 455B.1-.9, .30-.49 (Supp. 1973).
5. Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, 52
IowA L. Rv. 186, 202 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hines].
6. Id.
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trusted primary responsibility for pollution control to the State
Health Department.7 The power to enforce pollution abatement was
considered tough and progressive in its time and was significantly aug-
mented in 1949,0 allowing the Health Department to maintain the
relative effectiveness that characterized most of its forty-two years of
primacy in administering the control program.10 By the early sixties,
however, public discontent with Health Department administration of
the control program, primarily because of the leisurely pace of en-
forcement,1 prompted the Governor to appoint a special subcom-
mittee to study the water pollution control situation in Iowa.12 One
sentence of the subcommittee's final report summarized its findings:
"We have no state body or authority existing at the present time that
has the knowledge, background and experience, the resources in men
or money, or the authority to adequately provide a water pollution
control program."13
The subcommittee recommended creation of a commission that
would be given complete jurisdiction over water pollution control1 '
and drafted legislation that was enacted in 1965.15 The Iowa
Water Pollution Control Commission (IWPCC), established by
the 1965 Act, was, however, primarily a policy-making body, with-
out personnel of its own and dependent upon the Health Depart-
ment to carry out its decisions.16 In addition, the IWPCC was provided
7. Ch. 37, § 1, [1923] Iowa Acts 40th G.A. 33 (repealed 1965).
8. Hines & Schantz, Improving Water Quality Regulation in Iowa, 57 IowA
L. REv. 231, 241 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hines & Schantz].
9. Ch. 79, [1949] Iowa Acts 53d G.A. 108, amending IowA CODE § 135 (1946).
10. Hines & Schantz 245.
11. Hines 208-09. The conciliatory approach of Health Department officials
was based on an interpretation of the 1923 law that extended the times for
compliance with the first orders issued pursuant to that law. Hines & Schantz 242.
12. Hines & Schantz 245.
13. Id., citing GovERNoR's WATER POLLUTION STUDY SUBCOMMITTEE, FINAL
REPORT 10 (1964).
14. Hines & Schantz 245.
15. Hines 209-11.
16. Hines & Schantz 246. The Act provided: "The commission through the
state department of health shall have general supervision over administration and
enforcement of all laws relating to the pollution of any waters of the state, except
as provided in section [135.11) of the Code." Oh. 375, § 9, [1965] Iowa Acts 61st
G.A. 540 (repealed 1972) (emphasis added).
Section 135.11 provided for performance by the Health Department of some of
the same functions purportedly entrusted to the IWPCC by the 1965 Act. Corn-
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no means to ensure Health Department compliance with its direc-
tives. 7 The Health Department's undermanned field service and in-
vestigative arm was unable or unwilling to undertake tasks set for it
by the IWPCC.'5 As a result, the INVPCC relied heavily on the
State Hygienic Laboratory at the University of Iowa for much of its
investigatory work.1 9 Health Department resentment at the interjec-
tion of the IWPCC into the pollution control program and the
IWPCC's increasing reliance on outside assistance caused inter-agency
conflict.20 Eventually, the cumbersome scheme of shared authority
and the lack of Health Department accountability to the IWPCC
generated friction sufficient on occasion to bring the pollution con-
trol program to a standstill.1
The 1972 Act represents a sweeping administrative reorganization of
the control program.22 It creates a separate parent agency, the
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), to administer the
State's combined pollution control programs in the problem areas
of air quality, chemical technology, solid waste disposal, and water
pollution control.2 3 Under the 1972 Act each problem area is assigned
to a separate commission having exclusive policy-making power within
its assigned sphere.24 The function of the DEQ is to coordinate the
programs of the commissions through the DEQ's Executive Commit-
pare IowA CODE § 135.11 (1972) with IOWA CODE § 455B.17(3) (1971). Section
135.11 was amended by the 1972 Act to eliminate this overlap. See ch. 1119, §
112, [1972] Iowa Acts 64th G.A. 401, amending IOWA CODE § 135.11 (1972).
17. The Act provided that "the department of health in accordance with the
direction and policies of the [IWPCC] may" issue orders. Oh. 375, § 11, [19651
Iowa Acts 61st G.A. 540 (repealed 1972) (emphasis added). The IWPCC was
not granted authority to order an investigation on its own motion. Id. § 9(3).
18. In the 1930's the Health Department had eighteen professional engineers;
in 1968 it had three. In terms of professional man-years expended per capita of
population, Iowa ranked 50th among the states in 1970. Hines & Schantz 262.
19. Id. at 303-04.
20. The Chairman of the IWPCC at one point described the situation as
"intolerable." Id. at 248. Although likely to produce friction, the 1965 Act was a
compromise drafted so as to avert all-out opposition from the Health Department,
which was loath to lose administration of its program. Id. at 252.
21. Id.
22. IowA CODE § 455B (Supp. 1973).
23. Id. §§ 455B.2, -.4.
24. Id. § 455B.5(2).
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tee25 and to administer the programs in compliance with the rules and
regulations adopted by the Executive Committee and the commis-
sions.26 The most important impact of the 1972 Act upon Iowa's
water pollution control program is the shift of policy-making and
administrative responsibilities from the Health Department to an inde-
pendent agency entrusted with developing a comprehensive pollution
control program for the state.2 7
The reorganization also includes the newly-created Water Quality
Commission (WQC). As compared to its predecessor, the IWPCC,
the size of the WQC was reduced by confining most ex officio member-
ship of outside agency heads to the Executive Committee. 28 The only
ex officio member of the WQC is the Chairman of the Iowa Develop-
ment Commission, whose input helps to coordinate the WQC's policies
with the Iowa developmental policies. 2 9
Although special interest representation on the WQC has been
retained,so such representation has been pared to a more even balance
with representatives of the public at large.3 1 Special interest repre-
sentation is a common feature of state programs,32 and there is evi-
25. Id. § 455B.7(3). The composition of the Executive Committee attests to
its coordinating function. Included as nonvoting members are the heads of various
state agencies more or less concerned with pollution control, as well as both the
Director of the Bacteriological Laboratory at Iowa State University and the
State Geologist. Id. § 455B.6. Such diverse membership is valuable because pol-
lution problems are not always neatly classified into subject areas.
26. Id. § 455B.3.
27. Letter from the Director; see IowA CODE § 455B.3(5), (7) (Supp. 1973).
28. The IWPCC included as voting members the Commissioner of Public
Health, the Director of the State Conservation Commission, the Director of the
Iowa Resources Council, a staff member of the state university having technical
knowledge in the field of water pollution, the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Director of Soil Conservation, and five state electors, one representing industry,
one municipal government, one owner-operator farmers, and two the public at
large. See ch. 375, § 4, [1965] Iowa Acts 61st G.A. 540, as amended, ch. 262,
§ 1, [1969] Iowa Acts 63d G.A. 351 (repealed 1973).
29. IowA CODE § 455B.4(2) (Supp. 1973). The Iowa Development Commis-
sion fosters the growth of Iowa industry. IowA CODE § 28 (1971).
30. IowA CODE § 455B.4(2) (Supp. 1973) (such representation includes di-
versified farming and privately owned manufacturing).
31. Id. (two of the five members are electors representing the public).
32. See Stein, Problems and Programs in Water Pollution, 2 NATURAL RE-
souRcEs J. 388, 406 (1962).
Great diversity exists among the states with respect to interest representation.
See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13201 (a) (1)-(7) (Deering Supp. 1973) (members
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dence that the more potential polluters are involved with control
programs, the greater is their willingness to cooperate.3 3 This view
is shared by DEQ personnel, who regard the WQC as "one of the
most effective, well-informed, unbiased Commissions in the United
States."z4
As part of the attempt to improve coordination between policy
formulation and administration, the 1972 Act provides that the Execu-
tive Director of the DEQ shall attend WVQC meetings35 and may rec-
ommend the adoption of rules and regulations to implement the pro-
grams and services assigned to the WQC. Since the WQC is composed
of laymen,-, the Executive Director provides a valuable professional
input.A7 Apart from the obvious disadvantages of a part-time lay
commission devoting only limited time to detailed review of the pro-
gram, DEQ personnel feel that such a commission is peculiarly
"able to retain [its] objectivity and overall view of water quality prob-
lems ...without getting bogged down in insignificant detail which
should be handled by professional staff."s Moreover, continuity of
administration and enforcement seems more likely under the Executive
Director than under the Health Department, given the new independ-
ence of the DEQ and its staff.
A potential threat to the DEQ's independence stems from the failure
represent water supply, conservation, irrigated agriculture, industrial water use,
municipal government, county government, and non-governmental recreation
organizations; three members are not associated with any of the foregoing, two of
whom shall have special competence in water quality related areas); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 111V2, §1005(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973) (five technically qualified
members); N.Y. ENVIRONMNENTAL CONSERVATION LAW § 5-0101 (McKinney
1973) (all to be qualified to analyze matters of environmental concern, one each
to represent conservationists and industry, and four to represent public health,
natural sciences, urban studies, or other environment related disciplines); N.D.
CENr. CODE § 61-02-04 (Supp. 1973) (only qualification is that members be
electors).
33. Hines 219.
34. Letter from the Director.
35. IowA CODE § 455B.4 (Supp. 1973).
36. Commission members are paid on a per diem basis and are not required
to have any training in the area of pollution control. Id. §§ 455B.4(2), (4).
Compare Iowa with Illinois where the Illinois Pollution Control Board members
are paid $30,000 annually and must be "technically qualified." ILL. ANN. STAT.
lllY/, § 1005(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973).
37. The Director is selected on the basis of his administrative abilities. IowA
CoE § 455B.2 (Supp. 1973).
38. Letter from the Director.
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of the 1972 Act to make the Executive Director ultimately account-
able to the policy-making commissions and the Executive Committee.
Because he is appointed by the Governor and serves "at his pleasure,"30 1
there has been some concern that the Executive Director may become
the focal point of a "politically explosive" power struggle such as
that experienced under the Health Department. The Executive
Director may be forced to choose between obedience to the Execu-
tive Committee or dismissal by the Governor.40 Although confron-
tation is conceivable, it is unlikely precisely because interference by
the Governor with lawful Committee directives would be politically
explosive. In addition, direct interference by the Governor would
probably be unnecessary because he appoints the commissioners who
select the Executive Committee. 41 Given the Governor's extensive
control over the composition of both the policy-making and adminis-
trative sectors of the DEQ, the true danger, if any, is not that of
confrontation, but of partisan influence over the control program as a
whole.42
Another structural modification, however, provides a contrapuntal
balance to any threat of political influence. The legislature gave ex-
press recognition to the vital role of the State Hygienic Laboratory by
amending the statute to include among the Laboratory's duties "en.
vironmental quality services which, by contract, are requested by the
department of environmental quality."43 Although this denies the
DEQ an in-house scientific and technical establishment, the indepen-
dence of the Laboratory gives it potential for a watchdog role within
the overall program.4 4 In addition, the Laboratory's excellence con-
stitutes a positive asset to the quality of the program.4"
39. IowA CoDE § 455B.2 (Supp. 1973).
40. Hines & Schantz 258-59.
41. IowA CODE §§ 455B.4-.6 (Supp. 1973). Compare id. with Micii. STAT.
ANN. § 3.521(1) (1969) (Governor appoints three; four are ex oflcio) and N.D.
CENT. CODE § 61-02-04 (Supp. 1973) (Governor appoints five members and is
himself a member).
42. The decision to make the Executive Director accountable to the Governor
rather than to the Executive Committee also "involves a judgment of the political
practicalities of the situation." Cf. Hines 219. The Governor does not act in a
vacuum. The legislative judgment favored having the Executive Director ultimately
accountable to a highly visible elected official rather than to tenured appointees.
43. Ch. 1119, § 10, [1972] Iowa Acts 64th G.A. 401, amending IowA Cona§ 263.8 (1972).
44. Hines & Schantz 259.
45. Letter from the Director.
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In contrast to the marked structural reorganization of the Iowa
pollution control program accomplished by the 1972 Act, the enforce-
ment provisions, which form the heart of that program, have been
carried over from the 1965 Act almost unchanged.46 The powers
granted to the WQG and the Executive Director are comparable to
those of other modem state water pollution control laws47 The WQG
can issue subpoenas to violators,4s engage in informal negotiations, 49
conduct public hearings,- 0 grant a reasonable time for compliance
with orders,5' and initiate legal proceedings for the enforcement of
orders. - The Executive Director conducts investigations ordered by
the WQC, - and issues routine orders for prevention or abatement
46. Id. Compare ch. 375, § 9-28, [1965] Iowa Acts 61st G.A. 540 (repealed
1972), with IowA CODE §§ 455B.30-.48 (Supp. 1973).
47. Compare IOwA CODE § 455B.32(1) (Supp. 1973) (authority to develop
comprehensive plans and programs) with OHIo RE V. CODE ANN. §§ 6111.13, -.41
(Page Supp. 1973) and TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-328(a) (Supp. 1973).
Compare IowA CODE § 455B.32(2) (Supp. 1973) (authority to set water
quality standards) with ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.070, -.080 (1971) and TENN.
CODE ANN. § 70-328(a) (Supp. 1973).
Compare IowA CODE § 455B.32(3) (Supp. 1973) (authority to establish rules
and regulations governing its programs) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6011
(1970).
Compare IowA CODE § 455B.37(3) (Supp. 1973) (authority to order change
in method of waste discharge) with ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1904(6) (Supp. 1973)
and RI. GEN. LAws ANN,. § 46-12-8 (1971) and WXs. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.025(2)
(d) (1), (2) (d) (2) (r) (Supp. 1973).
Compare IOwA CODE § 455B.46 (Supp. 1973) (authority to require submis-
sion of plans for waste disposal systems) with ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1904(7)
(Supp. 1973) and TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-329(k) (Supp. 1973).
Compare IowA CODE § 455B.43 (Supp. 1973) (authority to direct attorney
general to bring action for injunction) with TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-339 (Supp.
1973).
48. IowA CODE § 455B.37 (Supp. 1973).
49. Id. § 455B.34.
50. Id. § 455B.32(7). The Commission may authorize the Executive Director to
conduct such hearings. This power of delegation would ensure continuity and
efficiency of enforcement that might otherwise be lacking with a part-time Com-
mission.
51. Id. 455B.37(4); cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-511(4) (Supp. 1973); INn. ANN.
STAT. § 68-525 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.025 (2)(d)(1) (Supp. 1973).
52. IowA CODE § 455B.38 (Supp. 1973); cf. IND. ANN. STAT. § 68-527 (1961).
53. IowA CODE § 455B.33(1) (Supp. 1973). The WQC's power to order
inviestigations on its own motion lends new flexibility to the plan. Under the 1965
Act the WQC had first to receive a request from outside agencies or citizens
to institute an investigation. The Executive Director may also conduct investiga-
tions upon the written request of any state agency, political subdivision, local board
of health, or 25 state residents. Id.
19741
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of pollution according to rules and regulations established by the
WQC.54
Failure to obey any order constitutes prima fade evidence of con-
tempt,55 but it is only after notice, a hearing, and a court order that
continued noncompliance subjects the offender to the penalties pro-
vided in the Act.s- The inefficiency of this procedure for compelling
compliance, which entails full litigation of the reasonableness and
validity of the order,57 constitutes the major weakness of the enforce-
ment plan. This weakness, however, is mitigated by the fact that fail-
ure to appeal an order within thirty days renders the order conclu-
sive.53 Theoretically, the same inefficiency hampers enforcement when
the violators make a timely appeal because no special probative
weight is given to the Commission's findings that led to issuance of the
order.59 In practice, however, hearings before the WQC resulting in
the issuance of formal orders are seldom held, and consequently,
there are few formal orders either to be enforced through contempt
proceedings or to be appealed.oS
A singular feature of the Iowa law is the requirement that the
54. Id. § 455B.33(3). In other states this duty is assigned to the water
quality control boards. See, e.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 82-1904(6) (Supp. 1973);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 68-525 (1961); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 70-328, -329 (Supp.
1973). The WQC may also issue emergency orders. IOwA Con § 455B.37(2)
(Supp. 1973).
55. IowA CODE § 455B.44 (Supp. 1973).
56. Id. It should be observed, however, that the new Act increases the fine to
a maximum of $500 for each day of noncompliance. This compares to $100
for each offense under the 1965 Act. Ch. 375, § 24, [1965] Iowa Acts 61st
G.A. 540 (repealed 1972). The increased fine has only been applied once, and
the effect of the increase is as yet difficult to assess. Nevertheless, the higher fines
are felt to have given the Department a badly needed enforcement tool. Letter
from the Director.
Other states have also made each day of noncompliance a separate offense. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6013(c) (Supp. 1970); N.H. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
§ 149:19 (1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-337(a) (Supp. 1973).
57. At the hearing the sole issue is whether the order was lawful and reasonable,
and if so, the court shall order compliance. See IowA CODE § 45513.44 (Supp.
1973). See also MANN. STAT. ANN. § 115.05(9) (1964) (order considered prima
facie reasonable and valid); N.H. Ruv. STAT. ANN. § 149:14 (1964) (order
given effect of lower court judgment).
58. IowA CODE § 455B.42 (Supp. 1973).
59. The hearing on appeal is treated as a suit in equity and is heard de novo.
Id. § 455B.39.
60. Of the 120 cases included in one study, in only two did negotiations fall to
result in a consent order. Hines & Schantz 322.
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WQC engage in informal negotiations as the first step in the enforce-
ment process. These negotiations usually culminate in the entry of
consent orders and must precede the entry of formal orders.61 The
informal approach presents several difficulties, however, because the
1972 Act makes no mention of consent orders. The failure to describe
the legal effects and enforcement procedures for consent orders may
yield untoward results because the only procedures for enforcement in
the Act are those applicable to formal orders. The violator, after con-
ceding that a condition in need of correction exists and agreeing to
correct that condition, may fail to comply because no penalty can be
imposed for noncompliance until after a hearing, a court order for
compliance, and continued noncompliance. The violator may succeed
in postponing pollution control modifications by using the informal
consent procedure as a delaying tactic32 and, under a literal reading
of the Act, force the DEQ to litigate the validity and reasonableness
of all issues disposed of by the order to which the violator voluntarily
consented. 3 In addition, although the Act does not specifically pro-
vide for appeal of a consent order, the violator obtains the equivalent
of an appeal by forcing the DEQ to initiate contempt proceedings.
The fundamental impediment to an effective informal consent pro-
cedure is the lack of any means, such as a performance bond or the
power to levy fines, by which the VQC can prevent abuse of the
procedure and ensure good faith compliance.- In some cases, this
61. IowA CODE § 455B.34 (Supp. 1973). The DEQ's preference for persuasion
is common to most state agencies; other agencies achieve similar results through
administrative discretion. See Stein, supra note 32, at 406.
62. Morcover, by the time the case could be decided, the court would probably
have to extend the timetable set out in the consent order. See Iowa Water Pol-
lution Control Comnm'n v. Town of Paton, 207 N.W.2d 755, 759, 765 (Iowa 1973).
63. The Act provides no criteria for determining the reasonableness of a con-
sent order or of any other order. Conceivably, the violator might interpose finan-
cial hardship, inadequate time to comply because of difficulty in obtaining bids,
contractors, architects, designs or materials, or even delay by the DEQ itself in
approving plans. Id. at 762-65.
64. Compare this with the provisions of the recent Illinois Act, which em-
powers the Illinois Pollution Control Board to levy fines against violators and to
require the posting of a security bond to ensure correction of the condition in
return for a temporary variance. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 14, §§ 1035-38, 1042
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973). For a discussion of the Illinois Act see 1973 URBAN
L. ANN. 353.
The Pennsylvania Pollution Control Board can impose a penalty of up to
$10,000, plus $500 for each day of continued violation without resort to judicial
process. PA. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 691.605 (Purdon Supp. 1973).
1974]
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deficiency frustrates the legislative intent underlying provision for
informal settlement of pollution problems-to avoid unnecessary liti-
gation and to continue the tradition of reasonableness and concilia-
tion in enforcement proceedings.
A recent case has resolved several questions left unanswered by the
1972 Act as to the effects of a consent order. In Iowa Pollution Con-
trol Commission v. Town of PatonG5 the Supreme Court of Iowa
affirmed the WQC's authority to enter into consent orders with
violatorser and held that "the validity and reasonableness of a color-
able commission order are conclusively established by failure to appeal
as to circumstances then existing and reasonably foreseeable."07 The
court narrowed the issues that may be raised in a contempt proceeding
seeking compliance with a consent order to those issues affecting the
reasonableness or validity of a consent order raised by "subsequent
events not reasonably foreseeable at the time the unappealed order
65. 207 N.W.2d 755 (Iowa 1973). The action was brought under the 1965
Act and decided after the 1972 Act came into effect. For convenience, the court
referred to the sections of the 1965 Act because the provisions involved in the
case were "nearly identical" to those of the present Act. Id. at 757.
The facts of the case were as follows: Defendant, Town of Paton, population
340, entered into a consent order in 1968 with the IWPCO to modify its sewage
system after pollution was discovered at points of discharge. Defendant under-
took initial steps to comply but was unable to meet the original schedule be-
cause of engineering problems and failure of its financing plan. Defendant
ceased efforts to comply and failed to file progress reports with the IWPCC,
which therefore brought a contempt proceeding to compel compliance with the
consent order. The trial court ordered compliance and set a new schedule.
Defendant appealed, asserting, inter alia, that financial hardship imposed by the
modifications rendered the order unreasonable in view of defendant's small pop-
ulation. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the trial court's hold-
ing and ordered compliance according to a new schedule. Id. at 755.
66. The Act does not expressly provide for the entry of consent orders by the
Department. The court, reasoning from both the statutory directive for the hold-
ing of informal negotiations and the implied grant of authority to enter into
agreements to resolve the problem, held that the IWPCC had authority to
enter consent orders to enforce those agreements. The court concluded that such
orders, entered after admission of culpability, waiver of hearing, and negotiated
agreement, were entered on the same premise as consent judgments entered by a
court. Id. at 760.
67. Id. at 763. Reasoning in pari materia, the court concluded that to allow
the reasonableness and validity of a consent order to be litigated would defeat the
legislative purpose of providing for informal resolution of pollution problems. The
court held that IowA CODE § 455B.21 (1966) (now IowA CODE § 455B.42
(Supp. 1973)), which precludes review as to reasonableness and validity of an
unappealed order, applies to consent orders.
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was entered. ' ' s The court also construed the Act as not allowing
financial hardship to bear upon the reasonableness or validity of
ordered improvements, and limited the consideration of unforesee-
able financial hardship to the question of the reasonableness of the
terms of the ordered improvements.69 Finally, the court vigorously re-
jected the argument that the action was premature, suggesting that
the DEQ can act as soon as a party to a consent order indicates an
intent not to comply, rather than awaiting the expiration of the
order.70
For the past fifty years Iowa has demonstrated an active commit-
ment to the goal of water pollution control by successive enactments
of progressive legislation. By establishing the Department of Environ-
mental Quality in 1972, thereby completely reorganizing its water
pollution program for the second time in eight years, Iowa has re-
sponded to the pressing problem of water pollution and shown itself
willing to seek effective solutions. At the same time, Iowa has pre-
served a tradition of informal proceedings within its new program,
evincing a continued concern that the party attempting to comply
in good faith with the state's efforts to clear its waters should be
treated reasonably and fairly."' Although the program has flaws
and contains unwieldy procedural safeguards for alleged polluters, the
Supreme Court of Iowa has given strong indication that it is sympa-
thetic to proper enforcement. The result is a plan that, while
uniquely suited to Iowa, offers improved solutions to the omni-pres-
ent problem of water pollution control.
Frederick M. Baker
68. 207 N.W.2d at 763.
69. "Such evidence does not bear on whether the pollution must be abated,
but it does affect how and when abatement is to be accomplished." Id.
70. On appeal, defendant argued that the action was prematurely brought,
alleging that the delay in compliance was due to factors beyond its control. The
court rejected this contention stating:
Its argument [that] this action is premature is palpably unconvincing. The
commission had sufficient reason to initiate this action; the town's position
since then supports the commission's concern about the necessity of reinforc-
ing its order by obtaining a court order requiring compliance.
... The town was content to let matters slide until the commission awakened
to the fact [that] the consent order was not being followed.
Id. at 765.
71. The court in Paton placed great weight on the Act's repeated reference to
the reasonableness standard. Id. at 763. This standard has long been a keynote
of program administration in Iowa.
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